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10.1177/0739456X04267714 ARTICLELevine et al.and Use and Transportation Alternatives
A Choice-Based Rationale for Land Use
and Transportation Alternatives
Evidence from Boston and Atlanta
Jonathan Levine, Aseem Inam, & Gwo-Wei Torng
An Alternative Rationale for
Land Use–Transportation Policies
One of the most controversial issues in transportation policy currently is the useful-
ness of alternative development practices including new urbanism, jobs-housing bal-
ance, transit villages, or “smart growth.” This debate largely revolves around the capac-
ity of these land use alternatives to reduce demand for automotive transport. Planning
scholars have differed on this question, with some arguing for such capacity (e.g.,
Cervero 1996, 1998; Frank and Pivo 1994) and others maintaining that impacts of land
use policy on auto use are ambiguous, weak, or absent (e.g., Crane 1996; Giuliano and
Small 1993; Gordon, Richardson, and Jun 1991; see reviews by Badoe and Miller 2000;
Boarnet and Crane 2001). Implicit to this framing of the debate is an assumption
regarding burdens of proof: those who would propose alternatives to auto-oriented
development patterns ought to be able to demonstrate payoffs in travel behavior modi-
fication. For one side the burden has been shouldered, for the other it has not; but the
definition of the problem is largely shared between both sides of this debate.
This problem definition would make sense if alternative land use practices consti-
tuted a regulatory intervention into a status quo that is otherwise the product of con-
sumer preferences, aggregated through land development markets to produce metro-
politan form. This article challenges this notion and argues that the debate has focused
on the wrong question.
The study argues that existing development patterns (at least in some metropolitan
areas) fail to offer residential choices that would satisfy the transportation–land use
preferences of a substantial minority of the population. This failure is not an outcome
of market disinterest but is a product of barriers to the alternative development forms
referred to above; significant among these barriers are municipal regulations in the
form of zoning, subdivision regulations, roadway design, and parking standards that in
aggregate constitute a design template for auto-oriented development. Only in areas
where that template is relaxed can land markets produce the alternative development
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Abstract
The usefulness of land use and transporta-
tion approaches including new urbanism,
smart growth, transit villages, and jobs-
housing balance is frequently assessed
based on the capacity of these innovations
to reduce auto use. This study, in contrast,
argues that regulatory barriers to these ap-
proaches underpin their relative scarcity
and that removal of these barriers de-
mands no justification in proof of travel-
behavior modification. Rather, such re-
form can improve the fit between people’s
transportation–land use preferences and
actual neighborhood choices. This fit is
compared here between two distinct U.S.
metropolitan areas: Boston and Atlanta.
In providing a greater range of neighbor-
hood types, Boston allowed a closer fit be-
tween household transportation–land use
preference and actual neighborhood
choice than did Atlanta. This suggests the
potential gains in household choice from
removal of barriers to alternative develop-
ment forms.
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forms and satisfy the preferences of people who would seek to
choose these alternatives.
By impeding this kind of development, these regulatory
barriers have made it more difficult for people who prefer tran-
sit- and pedestrian-friendly residential environments to satisfy
these preferences. This phenomenon is demonstrated here
through a comparison between metropolitan Boston and
Atlanta. Boston was selected as a metropolitan area that offers
a range of neighborhood types, from auto-oriented to transit-
and pedestrian-friendly. This is not a product of superior plan-
ning practice but primarily of an artifact of the historical era
within with the Boston region developed. In contrast, the hous-
ing stock of metropolitan Atlanta is much more dominantly in
zones developed for automobile access under a modern subur-
ban zoning regime in the post–World War II era. The study
tests the notion that residents of Boston—as an area with a wide
variety of neighborhood types—will exhibit a closer fit
between their transportation–land use preferences and their
actual neighborhood choices than will residents of an area,
such as Atlanta, that is developed in a more uniformly
automobile-dependent manner.
This notion is hardly self-evident. If nearly all households
preferred low-density, auto-oriented neighborhoods even at
the cost of high auto use—“the American dream”—an envi-
ronment that uniformly matches this description would sup-
port a tight fit between preferences and choices. The mis-
match that is measured here is a product of a divergence
between the distribution of housing units across neighbor-
hood types on one hand and the distribution of transporta-
tion–land use preferences among the population on the other.
The match between transportation–land use preferences
and residential location choices is assessed in three principal
steps. First, the territories of metropolitan Atlanta and Boston
are each divided into five classes based on transportation and
land use characteristics. Second, original survey data of eight
hundred households in each area are analyzed to classify resi-
dents’ transportation–land use preferences along a contin-
uum from pedestrian- and transit-oriented neighborhoods to
auto-oriented neighborhoods. Finally, a discrete choice model
is estimated to test the sensitivity of respondents’ choice of
neighborhood type to their transportation and land use pref-
erences. Because of the broader range of neighborhood offer-
ings in Boston, neighborhood choices were much more sensi-
tive to transportation–land use preferences than in Atlanta;
simply put, the Bostonians were more able to translate their
preferences into actual neighborhood choices than their
Atlanta counterparts.
Findings are interpreted in support of transportation–land
use policy reform based on satisfying household preferences
rather than modifying travel behavior. A sprawling develop-
ment pattern is seen by many as the choice of the land
development market; under that view, planning comes to com-
pel greater compactness (with justification according to some
observers, without sufficient basis according to others). By
demonstrating that a relatively uniformly auto-oriented metro-
politan area actually fits its residents’ transportation–land use
preferences worse than does a more richly variegated region,
this study suggests that these assumptions about “what the mar-
ket wants” may be without basis. Markets for pedestrian- and
transit-oriented development are unlikely to function where
municipal regulation precludes these development forms. For
this reason, scientific evidence of travel behavior modification
is not the logical prerequisite to planning reform that seeks to
remove regulatory barriers to “smart growth.” Rather, such
reform is best grounded in facilitating the preferences of
households that would choose such pedestrian- and transit-
friendly environments if they were available.
 Impact of Regulation on
Metropolitan Form
Barriers to the development of denser, more accessible,
and more mixed-use alternatives come in a number of forms
and include banks’ lending practices, developers’ inclinations
to stay with demonstrably successful formulas, and others. This
study is principally interested in the barriers that regulatory
policy itself may place in the way of such development. Of
these, local land use regulation in the form of subdivision regu-
lation, zoning, and negotiated agreements, together with
transportation regulation pertaining to minimum roadway
and parking standards, may be the most significant (Inam,
Levine, and Werbel 2002).
That zoning reduces development density by regulation to
submarket levels is not novel. Under the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act of 1926, zoning is designed, among other goals,
to “prevent the overcrowding of land; avoid undue concentra-
tion of population.” Urban economists tend to agree that land
use regulation compels a lower-density metropolitan form
than would arise in its absence; under this view, metropolitan
density is promoted (if at all) through regulatory liberaliza-
tion. Thus, they argue that minimum lot zoning fosters metro-
politan sprawl (e.g., Pasha 1996), that municipal land use regu-
lation increases the exclusivity of development patterns (e.g.,
Wheaton 1993), and that suburban zoning conflicts most fre-
quently take the form of disagreements between residents who
prefer low-density land uses and developers interested in
building higher-density uses (Bogart 1998, Fischel 1985).
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Yet following Tiebout (1956), the economics field has
sometimes viewed these effects in a relatively positive light
(e.g., Brueckner 2000). This is because the de facto capacity of
zoning regulations to exclude on the basis of income is seen as
fostering an efficient sorting of the population in terms of
demand for public goods. This is thought to lead to more
homogeneous jurisdictional units than would otherwise arise,
enabling each to offer its unique mix of public services and
taxes. (This is not a commentary on the legal propriety of
exclusionary zoning practices but an acknowledgement of the
capacity of zoning to foster exclusion.) Tiebout’s model was in
fact predicated on the presence of a growth-limiting factor
akin to exclusionary zoning: “The factor may be the limited
land area of a suburban community, combined with a set of
zoning laws against apartment buildings” (p. 419). The ostensi-
ble need for exclusionary zoning within the Tiebout model was
made explicit in a broadly accepted article by Hamilton
(1975): “Each community is authorized to enact a ‘zoning
ordinance’ which states ‘no household may reside in this com-
munity unless it consumes some minimum amount of hous-
ing’ ” (p. 206). Without this, “the Tiebout hypothesis seems to
be a formula for musical suburbs, with the poor following the
rich in a never-ending quest for a tax base” (p. 205).
Moreover, regulatory reduction of development densities is
often seen as a response to the negative externalities of higher-
density development to begin with and has been viewed as col-
lective assignment of property rights (Fischel 1985). In fact,
medium-to-high-density development is frequently zoned out
because of perceived externalities of traffic congestion, unde-
sirable visual impact, and more. It was the reformist impulse
early in the century to treat the extreme disorder of many cities
that led to the land use regulatory system observable today.
These negative impacts are clearly within planning’s legitimate
purview, and this study is not intended as a call for laissez-faire
policies in land development. But a sanguine view of the cur-
rent municipal land use regime—together with its capacity to
compel a sprawling development form—ignores its capacity to
reduce in aggregate the range of alternatives for households
that prefer different transportation–land use environments.
The implicit question of much transportation and land use
research—“Do we know enough about travel behavior to inter-
vene on behalf of metropolitan density?”—appears to neglect
what the economists hold: we are already intervening, only
against denser development patterns. Conversely, the sympa-
thetic position of some economists regarding lowering of met-
ropolitan densities by regulation appears to neglect the imped-
iment to choice that this regime imposes on households with
preference for pedestrian- or transit-friendly neighborhoods
and accessible living generally.
The Role of Land Use Planning
At first blush, the notion of policy and planning being
employed to exclude accessibility-based alternatives may
appear surprising. A conventional view seems to equate sprawl-
ing metropolitan forms with uncontrolled market forces; the
planning function then seeks to encourage alternatives to
sprawl. But in general, zoning ordinances limit densities or
floor-area ratios to a given maximum rather than setting a
floor. In most areas, land use regulation still seeks to separate
land uses, limiting mixing of housing with commercial uses or
even single-family housing of differing lot sizes. Minimum lot-
size requirements are a particularly pervasive form of regula-
tory control in newly developing areas. Transportation regula-
tions frequently specify wide street widths and minimum park-
ing requirements. In other words, embedded in the
regulations of scores of thousands of units of local government
is a design template that is largely inimical to the alternative
development forms. Only when that regulatory template is
relaxed can innovative development appear.
Evidence of the restrictive template imposed by the plan-
ning function can be found in numerous reports from around
the United States of developers seeking to build in a more com-
pact, accessible, or mixed-use fashion than regulations allow
and having their designs rejected or modified through the
planning process to conform to locally desired low-density pat-
terns. Frequently, the prescription from the planning authori-
ties is to return with a plan for conventional single-family devel-
opment on the site in question. A small selection of examples
follows:
An unusual proposal to plant a mini-village on a country
road west of Murfreesboro is dead. Murfreesboro planning
commissioners voted Wednesday night to deny a zoning
plan that would mix stores, offices and homes on 250 coun-
try acres off Florence Road. . . . Commissioners asked devel-
oper Roy Waldron to return with a zoning plan for single-
family homes. . . . The commission’s decision effectively kills
a proposal reminiscent of an increasingly popular form of
planning. In this kind of planning, the developer creates a
village by mixing stores with apartments and homes of vari-
ous sizes on variously sized lots. (The Tennessean, October 8,
1999)
“Smart growth” . . . means building higher density, mixed-
use developments closer into town and easily accessible by
transit. So MARTA and BellSouth tried to do just that, plan-
ning a 50-acre complex of offices, residences and shops that
would surround the Lindbergh MARTA station. Is every-
body happy then? Nope . . . the Buckhead Neighborhood
Planning Unit has voted 19-7 to reject the plan. [A scaled-
back version of the transit village was ultimately approved,
but a thirty-nine-story condominium complex was elimi-
nated from it.] (Atlanta Constitution, October 8, 1999)
Land Use and Transportation Alternatives  319
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The Jefferson County Commission has denied a request by
Fribis Engineering for rezoning slightly more than 50 acres
at Brennan and Hillsboro Valley Park roads from large-lot
residential to smaller-lot residential. The commission
agreed with the recommendation of the Planning and Zon-
ing Commission and not with the county Planning Depart-
ment. (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 1, 2002)
These stories describe the planning function being used to
reject or limit new urbanist–inspired development (in the Ten-
nessee case), transit-village construction (Atlanta), and subdi-
visions denser than allowed by regulation (St. Louis). In all
cases, the agents of densification were not public planners
(though the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
[MARTA] was involved with one proposal) but developers
seeking profits from a market they judged to support such
dense construction. While the public planners may be in favor
of allowing the denser development patterns (as with the St.
Louis case), the planning regulatory function may be used to
the opposite effect. To the extent that these stories are repre-
sentative—in fact, a brief search of news databases suggest they
are ubiquitous—they suggest that the debate on the accessibil-
ity-based development forms has unwittingly turned the plan-
ning-versus-the-market argument on its ear. In growing, highly
accessible areas, the land development market may tend
toward greater density, accessibility, and mixed-use develop-
ment than planning regulations and practice allow. If this is the
case, then analysis of the impact of urban form on travel behav-
ior—while an interesting and valid scientific endeavor—would
not be especially relevant as justification for the provision for
such alternatives.
The planning function is not always used to exclude den-
sity. But while planning can enable such development, it
requires private developers who see profits to be made to actu-
ally carry it out. Planning can facilitate market forces that tend
toward accessible development but can hardly create such
development when no market exists for it. An example is
found in the following story:
The city [of Westminster] wants to build a “test” develop-
ment project that includes a mix of residential housing with
retail and commercial uses. The idea is called “new urban-
ism” because it harkens back to the old mixed-use neighbor-
hood. . . . On Monday the city council gave the go-ahead to
seek proposals from developers for a mixed-use project.
One developer has expressed an interest to do such a pro-
ject. (Denver Rocky Mountain News, October 4, 1999)
Nearly two years later, a related story appeared regarding the
same site:
In late April the Westminister City Council agreed to
revamp its zoning rules to let Continuum build its brand of
denser, more urban-style development. (Denver Post, June
10, 2001)
Thus, the city can signal its interest but generally requires
involvement by private developers who see profits to be made
before the concept can be implemented. The worry about the
planning function being used to force high-density develop-
ment on an unwilling market is chimerical; as Bogart (1998,
212) aptly states, “While a suburb could also conceivably set a
minimum capital-land ratio, the immobility of land in the
model makes that option unenforceable because capital is free
to leave.” To implement its new urbanist vision, the city of
Westminister needed to liberalize its zoning regulations, as the
earlier version would have excluded the proposed develop-
ment. In this sense, even though the planning authorities
adopted an explicit prodensity stance, their actions were ulti-
mately permissive, rather than restrictive in nature.
The argument about planning regulations limiting inno-
vation in land use development is hardly a new one. But it
seems barely to have infiltrated the transportation and land
use debate surrounding the alternative development forms,
whose legitimacy is still broadly construed to hinge on
demonstrable travel behavior impacts. It is logically inconsis-
tent to hold that municipal regulatory practices impede inno-
vation in development on one hand but that reforms to per-
mit such innovation need to rest on scientifically proven
benefits in travel behavior modification on the other. The sci-
ence is interesting and important, but the policy question
does not hinge on it.
Residential Location Choice:
From Developers and Planners
to (Missing) Residents
When planning regulations exclude or limit accessibility-
based development forms, they restrict the ability of those
households that would have occupied such neighborhoods
from getting what they want in a transportation and land use
environment. Thus, one can conceive of an action excluding a
high-density transit village, for example, as the equivalent of
denying several hundred households the opportunity to reside
in what would have been their preferred residential environ-
ment. In municipal political processes, these households
hardly constitute a potent political force, as they are likely not
to be current residents of the community in question.
Moreover, these households are not even likely to under-
stand the process by which they had been excluded or to iden-
tify themselves as excluded by governmental regulation. The
household that would have occupied dense housing near a
transit station that was excluded by regulation might find its
desired neighborhood unaffordable but would probably opt
quietly for lower-cost housing elsewhere; given the paucity of
320 Levine et al.
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transit-oriented development, such locations would probably
be in automobile-oriented districts. (Having now located in
such an area, this household may well find itself opposing pro-
posals for higher-density development in its neighborhood,
thus completing the systematic cycle of exclusion of denser,
more accessible development forms.) If the processes hypoth-
esized here were highly influential, then households’ residen-
tial location choices could be constrained to the point that they
become a deteriorated indicator of actual preferences. This
would limit the capacity of studies of revealed preference to
impute the motivation of households for choosing between
given zones or housing types from their actual choices.
However, the phenomenon of constrained residential
choices would be observable as a weak connection between
households’ preferences for transportation and land use envi-
ronments and their actual residence in such environments.
Where choices are less constrained, households should be able
to forge a better “fit” between their preferences and their
choices. Thus, the relative impact of choice-reducing con-
straints on development of alternative neighborhood forms
may be observed as a weaker linkage between preferences and
choices in the more constrained area as compared with the less
constrained. Where a range of choices of neighborhood types
is readily available, households can be expected to sort them-
selves out according to their preference; where constraints
limit the availability of alternative choices, less of this self-
directed sorting would go on. This perspective can partially
overcome the limitation of revealed preference studies that
are restricted by constrained choice sets. The empirical study
reported here seeks to operationalize the notion of a fit
between transportation–land use preferences and neighbor-
hood choices and to compare this fit between the two
metropolitan areas under study.
Method
The regions studied here include the 10-county area of the
Atlanta Regional Council and the 101-town region of Metro-
politan Boston, the area of the Boston Metropolitan Planning
Organization. The two areas are roughly comparable in popu-
lation, with 1.1 million households in metropolitan Atlanta
and 930,000 in the Boston region, though the land area of the
much more densely built Boston is considerably less: 1,400
square miles as opposed to 3,000 for metropolitan Atlanta. The
geographical unit of analysis is the traffic analysis zone (TAZ).
TAZs are geographical units developed for transportation
modeling purposes; they are sized to contain roughly 2,000 res-
idents and/or employees and to serve as a logical neighbor-
hood unit for purposes of transportation analysis. The Atlanta
study area is divided into 928 TAZs, while the Boston region
contains 613 such zones.
Clustering Methodology and Results
The hundreds of zones in each region represent neighbor-
hoods or neighborhood agglomerations. For the purposes of
this study, these geographic units needed to be combined into
larger neighborhood types based on their transportation and
land use characteristics. This grouping of neighborhoods into
broad classes serves two purposes. First, it was designed to
define comparable areas between Boston and Atlanta; hence,
neighborhoods classified into a single category ought to dem-
onstrate similar land use and transportation characteristics
between the two metropolitan areas. Second, the grouping of
hundreds of zones into a limited set of neighborhood types
from which households choose is designed to facilitate the
tractability and interpretability of the choice model described
below.
Neighborhood transportation and land use characteristics
as generally measured at the metropolitan scale include attrib-
utes of density, road network characteristics, and regional and
local accessibility. (A number of finer-grained urban design
variables, such as sidewalk provision and street-front character-
istics, would have been useful in characterizing the transporta-
tion and land use character of a neighborhood but were not
available for all neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan
areas studied.) As neighborhoods vary across multiple dimen-
sions, a statistical technique was required for their grouping.
Cluster analysis is a multivariate technique that groups cases
based on their similarity across multiple measured attributes.
A K-Mean cluster analysis (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984)
was performed on TAZs of the two regions, utilizing the thir-
teen variables listed in the appendix. To render the meaning of
the clusters as consistent as possible between the two areas,
clustering was done for Atlanta and Boston in the same analy-
sis; that is, the TAZs of the two regions were combined in a sin-
gle data set, and clusters were created without regard to the
region in which they were located. In this fashion, the statistical
meaning—if not the perceived land use and transportation
implications—of a given cluster is the same between the two
regions.
To divide up the two regions into neighborhood types
based on the multidimensional data above, a set of five clusters
were specified a priori. This number was designed to corre-
spond roughly with five classes of areas: central business dis-
trict (cluster A), other central city (cluster B), inner suburban
(cluster C), middle suburban (cluster D), and outer subur-
ban/exurban (cluster E). For both Boston and Atlanta, the
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clusters fall into a distinct concentric pat-
tern, with generally increasing accessibil-
ity and transit and pedestrian orientation
toward the center of the metropolitan
area (see Figures 1 and 2). A visual inspec-
tion of the maps reveals the very signifi-
cant difference in profile between the two
metropolitan areas. The territory of
Atlanta is much more occupied by neigh-
borhoods in cluster E, the outermost and
least pedestrian/transit-friendly cluster,
than Boston. Boston, in contrast, pres-
ents observably more territory in clusters
B and C, which rank much higher in the
many dimensions that constitute accessi-
bility and transit and pedestrian friendli-
ness.1
The visual display of the clusters tends
to understate the difference between the
two regions in terms of availability of
housing in different neighborhood types.
For example, while less than 3 percent of
Atlanta households were located in
neighborhood type B, more than 17 per-
cent of Boston households lived in this
zone, a difference greater than that of the
relative areas of the zones (see Table 1).
Survey Methodology
A survey was developed and pretested
for conducting by telephone. The survey
focused on respondents’ transportation–land use preferences,
regardless of the neighborhood in which the respondents actu-
ally reside. Many of the key questions were phrased in trade-off
format, under the guiding philosophy that many people hold a
set of preferences that are internally contradictory; for exam-
ple, they may want walkability on one hand but only low-
density, land use separated development forms on the other.
The idea of the trade-off-styled questions was to force them
into a choice between potentially contradictory elements of
their preferences to ascertain which was a higher priority.
Examples of pairs of statements are given in Table 2;
respondents were asked to select between “a” and “b” and then
to indicate the intensity they felt for their chosen statement.
The survey sample was developed through a random selec-
tion of individuals in a consumer database drawing on multi-
ple sources, including credit reporting data. Overall, 1,607
individuals completed the survey for a response rate of 38.9
percent. Weights were applied to the sample to ensure that the
distribution of households in the sample matched the distribu-
tion of households across the neighborhood types.
Neighborhood Preferences and
Neighborhood Choices
The questions referred to in Table 2 were designed to elicit
respondents’ preferences along a number of dimensions per-
taining to transit or automobile orientation and pedestrian
environments. Preferences tended to move together; for
example, an individual indicating strong preferences for tran-
sit tended to indicate similarly strong preferences for pedes-
trian environments. Under conditions such as these, it is possi-
ble to use principal components analysis to create a limited
number of indices, or factors, that capture the underlying simi-
larity between individuals’ responses to questions that are
related in the fashion described above. By creating a small set
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Figure 1. Clustering results for Boston.
Note: MCD = minor civil division.
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of factors that represent a significantly larger number of vari-
ables, this technique can facilitate further modeling without
using the full set of variables. In this analysis, a single factor,
interpreted as an indicator of neighborhood transportation–
land use preferences, was extracted. For each respondent, a
factor score was calculated along a continuum from –2.2, indi-
cating preference for transit- and pedestrian-oriented neigh-
borhoods, to 2.3, indicating preference for auto-oriented
neighborhoods. The distribution of this
factor among the samples is displayed in
Table 3; the table displays the significantly
different preference structures of the
Atlanta and Boston samples, with the lat-
ter being considerably more inclined
toward transit- and pedestrian-oriented
neighborhoods than the former. None-
theless, it is worth noting that more than
29 percent of the Atlanta respondents
(and 40 percent of the Boston
respondents) expressed preferences for
transi t - and pedestr ian-oriented
neighborhoods (henceforth “pedestrian
neighborhoods”).
Given the combination of the diver-
gent preferences of residents of the two
areas and the significantly different met-
ropolitan form of each area, it may be
that differences in the characteristics of
people’s neighborhood environments
are explained by differences in their pref-
erences. For example, on the whole,
Atlantans live in more car-oriented envi-
ronments than Bostonians. Is the differ-
ence in their preferences sufficient to
explain the differences in the neighbor-
hood environments in which they find
themselves?
Data presented in Figure 3 suggest
that this is not the case. The figure dem-
onstrates the probability of residence in
zones A, B, or C, the three most transit-
and pedestrian-friendly zones in Atlanta,
by people’s transportation–land use pref-
erences. For example, people with the
strongest (i.e., top decile) preferences for
pedestrian neighborhoods in metropoli-
tan Boston had an 83 percent probability
of living in those zones; their Atlanta
counterparts with identical preferences
had only a 48 percent chance of living in
zone A, B, or C. This gap suggests that
there is demand in Atlanta for residence in transit- and pedes-
trian-friendly zones that is not satisfied given current choices.
Figure 3 appears to validate the transportation–land use
preference scale used in these analyses, as the mean transit-
pedestrian ratings of people’s environments declines quite
regularly as people’s preferences move from transit and pedes-
trian to more automobile-oriented environments. But more
important, it illustrates that the variation in residence in
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pedestrian neighborhoods is only partly explained by the dif-
ference in households’ preferences between the two regions.
Neighborhood Self-Selection
Differences between Boston and Atlanta residents can also
shed some light on the debate pertaining to the role of
neighborhood self-selection in the relationship between
urban form and travel behavior. Travel behavior studies regu-
larly document significant density effects on travel behavior
measures such as commute length (e.g., Frank and Pivo 1994;
Levinson and Kumar 1997). These studies have been criticized
on the basis of neighborhood self-selection; that is, if people
who prefer to walk or use transit select those neighborhoods,
the observed effect may not be attributable fully to design fac-
tors but to the tendency of households to gravitate to those
neighborhoods that offer them the transportation options
they seek (Boarnet and Sarmiento 1998). Eliminating this self-
selection “bias” amounts to testing the impact of urban form
on the average individual rather than the self-selected house-
holder with distinct predilections toward transit or
pedestrianism.
Yet given the gap depicted in Figure 3, it seems unlikely that
new transit-oriented housing in Atlanta would fill up with aver-
age Atlantans; rather, it would tend to be occupied by people
with distinct preferences for such housing who previously
lacked the ability to satisfy those preferences in the Atlanta envi-
ronment. Self-selection in this case would be a real effect, but it
would hardly negate the impact of urban form on travel behav-
ior. This is because in the absence of such development, those
households would be unlikely to reside in a pedestrian neigh-
borhood and would have little choice but to adopt auto-ori-
ented travel patterns. Where pedestrian neighborhoods are
undersupplied because of regulation or other constraints, the
self-selection effect associated with expansion of these neigh-
borhoods can be a very real impact—perhaps even the most sig-
nificant impact—of the urban form, rather than a source of sta-
tistical bias to be isolated and discarded. For this reason, studies
linking travel behavior to urban form are uninterpretable in the
absence of an underlying theory of neighborhood production.
Discrete Choice Modeling of
Choice of Neighborhood Clusters
Figure 3 is strictly bivariate and as such is unable to analyze
the relationship of preference and choice for particular
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Table 1.
Households by cluster, Atlanta and Boston,
1995 (in percentages).
Cluster Atlanta Households Boston Households
A 0.5 2.6
B 2.9 17.3
C 8.4 34.6
D 27.9 33.2
E 60.3 12.4
Source: 1995 estimates by Atlanta and Boston Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organizations (MPOs) and obtained directly from the two
MPOs.
Table 2.
Examples of trade-off-styled questions
to elicit neighborhood preference.
1a. I like living in a neighbor-
hood where people can walk
to places like stores, libraries,
or restaurants, even if this
means that the houses and
commercial areas are within a
block or two of each other.
1b. I like living in a neighbor-
hood where the commercial
areas are kept far from the
houses, even if this means that
people can’t walk to places
like stores, libraries, or
restaurants.
2a. I like living in a neighbor-
hood with single-family houses
on larger lots, even if this
means that public transit is
not available.
2b. I like living in a neighbor-
hood with a good bus and
train system, even if this
means a neighborhood with a
mix of single-family houses
and multifamily buildings that
are close together.
Table 3.
Distribution of neighborhood preference factor, Boston and Atlanta.
Very Strong Very Strong
Pedestrian Pedestrian Auto Auto
Neighborhood Neighborhood Mean Neighborhood Neighborhood
Neighborhood Preference Preference Preference Preference Preference Preference
Factor score standard deviations
from mean –2.2 to –1.5 > –1.5 to –0.5 –0.5 to <0.5 0.5 to <1.5 1.5 to 2.3
Boston 4.5% 35.5% 31.2% 24.3% 4.5%
Atlanta 6.4% 23.0% 29.7% 34.2% 6.7%
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zones or particular groups. Such an analysis would depend on
a modeling framework within which individual households
choose from among the identified neighborhood types.
Since neighborhood types here are conceived of discretely—
they are real places whose character shifts with different
development periods over space in a discontinuous fashion—
the tools of discrete choice are employed. In particular, the
choice from among the five neighborhood types identified is
modeled as a multinomial logit (Ben-Akiva and Lerman
1985). Six models were estimated for each metropolitan area:
a model for the population as a whole and models for whites;
nonwhites; and households of low, medium, and high
income. Each model has two sets of independent variables:
neighborhood-specific constants and the neighborhood
preference score described above (interacting with neighbor-
hood choices). In all cases, neighborhood type E is the omit-
ted category, and types A and B have been combined because
of low sample sizes in zone A.
The models are constructed to assess the closeness of the
“fit” between people’s transportation–land use preferences
and their choice of actual neighborhood and the sensitivity of
people’s choices to their preferences. That is, how readily can
people act upon their transportation–land use preferences
when selecting a residential location?
The models are presented in Table 4. All coefficients are
significant with at least 95 percent confidence with the excep-
tion of the models for nonwhites and the Boston model for low
income. All coefficients of
the preference score vari-
able carry the expected neg-
ative sign; lower preference
scores mean greater prefer-
ences for pedestrian neigh-
borhoods. In all cases (save
the model for nonwhites in
Boston), the coefficients
become progressively more
negative as the choices
approach the central A and
B zones, indicating the
impact of stronger pedes-
trian neighborhood prefer-
ences on the utility of
residence in one of those
zones.
All of the Atlanta models
have significantly greater
explanatory power than
their corresponding Boston
model. This can be gauged
with the pseudo-R2 statistic, the multinomial logit analog to
regression’s R2—a measure of the model’s overall explanatory
power. These statistics range around .3 to .4 for Atlanta and
around .1 to .2 for Boston. This is an artifact of the lopsided dis-
tribution of households in Atlanta, with 60 percent of house-
holds residing in zone E; Boston’s more even distribution of
households between zones tends to lead to less explanatory
power in the models. Two approaches are used to control for
this distribution effect. First, models with neighborhood alter-
native-specific constants—but no transportation–land use
preference data—were estimated. These models were then
compared to models that also incorporated information about
the respondent’s transportation–land use preferences. In five
out of six models estimated, the addition to the models’
explanatory power with the incorporation of preference data
was greater for Boston than for Atlanta. In other words, know-
ing what a respondent prefers in transportation and land use
gives us greater marginal information about what kind of
neighborhood he or she actually gets if that person is a Bosto-
nian than if that person is an Atlantan. The ability to act on
one’s preferences is a product of the choices available; in the
development market of Atlanta, lack of pedestrian neighbor-
hoods led to a disconnection between preference and choice
for people who desired that option.
This effect is seen much more acutely when the marginal
effects are examined.2 Marginal effects can be interpreted as
the change in probability of selection of a neighborhood type
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Figure 3. Relationship of transit-pedestrian preference to residence in transit- and pedestrian-friendly zones.
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that is associated with a 1-point move in the transportation–
land use preference score (Table 3). Thus, for example, a 1-
point move in a person’s preference score toward auto-
oriented neighborhoods is associated with a 25-percentage-
point reduction in the chance of living in zone A or B in Boston
but only a 3-percentage-point reduction in Atlanta. The con-
verse is true as well: a 1-point move toward pedestrian neigh-
borhood preference boosts the probability of living in zones A
or B by 25 percentage points in Boston but only 3 percentage
points in Atlanta. Thus, the marginal effects are interpreted as
an indicator of the sensitivity of a household’s neighborhood
choice to its transportation–land use preferences.
The difference between Boston and Atlanta is quite dra-
matic. Relative lack of choice in the Atlanta context rendered
one’s neighborhood selections much less sensitive to one’s
preferences than in Boston. In general, marginal effects for
zones A, B, and C were much greater in Boston than in Atlanta;
in contrast, marginal effects for zone D (the next-to-outer
ring) were somewhat greater in Atlanta. Given the greater sup-
ply of suburban housing in Atlanta, people with preferences
for this type of housing were slightly more able to satisfy those
preferences than their Boston counterparts. However, the rela-
tive Boston disadvantage in this neighborhood type is consid-
erably less than the relative advantage for the more pedestrian
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Table 4.
Multinomial logit models of choice of neighborhood type.
Less Than $35,000- $75,000
$35,000 $74,999 Income and
All Whites Nonwhites Income Income Greater
Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta
Coefficients of alternative
specific constants
Zones A or B –0.28 –3.26 –0.40 –3.58 1.14 –2.59 –0.07 –3.22 –0.57 –3.15 –0.54 —
(t-statistic) (–1.5) (–10.6) (–2.0) (–8.5) (1.4) (–5.6) (–0.2) (–4.8) (–1.6) (–5.8) (–1.5) —
Zone C 0.85 –1.74 0.75 –1.70 2.39 –1.89 0.92 –1.44 0.81 –1.99 0.55 –1.89
(t-statistic) (6.5) (–12.2) (5.6) (–10.7) (3.3) (–5.6) (3.8) (–5.3) (3.6) (–6.7) (2.2) (–7.2)
Zone D 1.05 –0.48 1.01 –0.58 1.91 –0.13 1.17 –0.31 0.97 –0.79 0.96 –0.76
(t-statistic) (8.5) (–5.3) (8.0) (–5.5) (2.6) (–0.73) (5.2) (–1.6) (4.6) (–4.3) (4.2) (–4.4)
Coefficients of neighborhood
preference scores
(interacting with
neighborhood choices)
Zones A or B –1.97 –1.73 –2.05 –2.02 –1.05 –0.91 –1.51 –2.35 –2.16 –1.62 –2.45 —
(t-statistic) (–10.4) (–6.0) (–10.4) (–5.6) (1.0) (–1.7) (–4.6) (–4.3) (–6.1) (–2.9) (–6.8) —
Zone C –1.22 –1.25 –1.2 –1.31 –1.41 –0.88 –1.04 –1.39 –1.14 –1.25 –1.44 –1.26
(t-statistic) (–8.4) (–8.1) (–8.2) (–7.8) (–1.4) (–2.3) (–4.0) (–4.8) (–4.5) (–3.9) (–5.4) (–4.7)
Zone D –0.55 –0.48 –0.55 –0.81 –0.30 –0.13 –0.30 –0.90 0.97 –0.65 –0.75 –0.80
(t-statistic) (–4.0) (–5.3) (–4.1) (–7.3) (0.3) (–0.7) (–1.3) (–4.5) (4.6) (–3.4) (–3.2) (–4.5)
Marginal effects of
neighborhood preference
scores on neighborhood
choicea
Zones A or B –0.25 –0.03 –0.26 –0.03 –0.13 –0.03 –0.19 –0.061 –0.26 –0.04 –0.29 —
Zone C –0.26 –0.08 –0.25 –0.09 –0.31 –0.06 –0.22 –0.11 –0.025 –0.07 –0.27 –0.07
Zone D –0.12 –0.14 –0.12 –0.14 –0.06 –0.10 –0.07 –0.17 –0.12 –0.11 –0.17 –0.12
Overall model statistics
n 798 800 748 653 50 147 241 191 262 215 245 284
Adjusted pseudo-R2 .13 .38 .13 .41 .23 .27 .12 .33 .12 .40 .15 .36
Adjusted pseudo-R2,
model with alternative-
specific constants only .05 .31 .05 .33 .19 .25 .07 .21 .05 .34 .02 .30
∆ = .08 ∆ = .07 ∆ = .08 ∆ = .08 ∆ = .04 ∆ = .02 ∆ = .05 ∆ = .12 ∆ = .07 ∆ = .06 ∆ = .13 ∆ = .06
Average neighborhood
preference scoresb –.38 .40 –.39 .46 –.24 .16 –.46 –.04 –.42 .39 –.34 .59
a. (δy/δx), where y = probability of selection of given neighborhood and x = transportation–land use preference score.
b. Boston-Atlanta differences significant with >.99 confidence. Differences within Boston groups not statistically significant. Differences
within Atlanta groups (ethnicity, income) significant with >.99 confidence.
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neighborhoods; this is further supported by the fact that the
marginal effect on explanatory power of the addition of trans-
portation–land use preference as an independent variable is
consistently greater for Boston than for Atlanta.
Similar analyses are displayed for population subgroups.
For example, marginal effects for nonwhites in both Boston
and Atlanta were significantly less than for whites, suggesting a
more constrained ability on the part of the nonwhites to act on
transportation–land use preferences. Analysis of marginal
effects at different income levels is revealing. In the case of the
Boston sample, the marginal effects increase markedly with
income. This is as expected; the higher one’s income, the
greater the effect one’s neighborhood preferences would have
on one’s neighborhood choices. Results for low-income peo-
ple in Atlanta are anomalous in this regard in that both the
marginal effects and the additional explanatory power of
neighborhood preferences appear to be highest in the low-
income group.
The multinomial logit model described in Table 3 can be
employed to estimate probabilities of residence in the various
zones for households of different socioeconomic characteris-
tics and transportation–land use preferences (see Table 5).
These results can help illustrate the difficulty of satisfying
preferences for pedestrian neighborhoods in an area like
Atlanta with constrained supply. For example, a person with
transit and pedestrian preferences stronger than 75 percent of
the sample would have a 25 percent probability of living in
zones A or B in Boston but only a 7 percent probability in
Atlanta. If the household were nonwhite, the relevant proba-
bility in Boston would drop to 14 percent but would remain
unchanged in Atlanta. A white household with median trans-
portation–land use preferences would have a 15 percent prob-
ability of living in outer zone E in Boston but a 57 percent prob-
ability in Atlanta. Thus, even when preferences are held
constant, these results suggest that the physical form of Atlanta
tends to result in choices of residential environments that are
less accessible metropolitan Boston.
None of the foregoing analysis is to suggest that prefer-
ences for the physical characteristics and accessibility of neigh-
borhoods dominate, or should dominate, other aspects of the
residential choice decision. Clearly, issues such as school qual-
ity and neighborhood safety tend to be more important to the
locational decisions of many if not most households. But this
analysis does not rest on any assumption of primacy of trans-
portation and accessibility factors. Rather, it is assumed that
where greater choices are available, more households will be
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Table 5.
Estimated probabilities of residence in neighborhood types, by
transportation–land use preference and socioeconomic group (in percentages).
Less Than $35,000- $75,000
$35,000 $74,999 Income
All Whites Nonwhites Income Income and Greater
Zone Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta Boston Atlanta
Respondent with pedestrian
neighborhood preference
greater than 75 percent
of sample
A or B 25 7 26 6 14 7 23 8 31 7 29 N/A
C 41 20 39 20 68 13 42 21 51 17 36 19
D 28 36 29 40 16 40 28 43 10 34 30 39
E 6 38 7 35 2 40 7 27 8 42 6 42
Respondent with median
pedestrian neighborhood
preferences
A or B 11 2 10 2 14 4 12 2 9 3 10 N/A
C 33 9 32 10 50 7 33 12 34 8 29 9
D 41 34 42 31 31 42 42 36 42 28 44 29
E 15 55 15 57 5 48 13 50 16 61 17 62
Respondent with pedestrian
neighborhood preferences
greater than 25 percent
of sample
A or B 4 1 3 0 12 2 5 0 1 1 2 N/A
C 22 4 21 4 30 4 22 5 11 4 17 4
D 48 28 48 21 48 42 52 24 76 20 47 18
E 27 68 28 74 9 53 21 70 13 76 34 78
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able to satisfy their preferences even for nonprimary charac-
teristics in their neighborhood wish list. For example, imagine
a locating household whose first priority is a neighborhood
with good schools and whose second priority is a neighbor-
hood that facilitates pedestrianism, transit, and short-distance
commuting. If all the neighborhoods affordable to this house-
hold that offer good schools are located in auto-oriented sub-
urbs with poor accessibility characteristics, it would likely
choose such a locale, and its preferences for accessible living,
transit, and pedestrianism would never be revealed. On the
other hand, if because of greater diversity of choice, the
desired neighborhood environmental characteristics could be
found in affordable communities with good schools, a
selection closer to the household’s preferences—both primary
and secondary—could be made.
Conclusion
This study was concerned with the core rationale for the
development of physical forms—including new urbanist
neighborhoods, transit villages, job-housing balance, and
“smart growth”—that seek to provide an alternative to low-
density, automobile-oriented neighborhoods and communi-
ties. Much of the research and policy debate currently sur-
rounding these physical and policy directions centers on the
potential impact their provision may or may not have on travel
behavior; under this formulation, scientific evidence establish-
ing the connection between alternative forms of urbanization
and reduced automobile use is the rationale for policies that
would be supportive of such alternatives.
Underlying such a framework is an implicit worldview that
current auto-dependent development patterns are the prod-
uct of individual preferences revealing themselves through
markets and that development of alternatives rests on plan-
ning’s regulatory intervention into market processes. But the
process of neighborhood development is hardly an unfet-
tered market, as is evidenced by the rich literature on
exclusionary zoning in the United States. Individual commu-
nities frequently employ their regulatory powers to limit cer-
tain types of land uses, notably housing that is likely to be
occupied by people of lower socioeconomic status than cur-
rent community residents. Very often, those land uses can con-
stitute precisely the kinds of alternatives to low-density, auto-
mobile-oriented development that are discussed in this article.
Where markets can support alternative development forms,
the primary benefit of these forms is in allowing their residents
to forge a closer link between their preferences for transporta-
tion and land use environments on one hand and their actual
choices on the other.
This study started from this notion, suggesting that a region
that offers rich alternatives in both low-density, auto-oriented
neighborhoods and pedestrian neighborhoods would afford
residents the opportunity to create a closer preference-choice
match than a region whose dominant development form was
low-density and automobile-oriented. This would hold if trans-
portation–land use preferences in the latter region were dis-
tributed more toward pedestrian neighborhoods than the
actual housing stock. By separately characterizing the prefer-
ences of households in Boston and Atlanta, and the character-
istics of the zones these households occupy, the study quanti-
fied the matches that each region offered its residents.
Bostonians both prefer and reside in more transit- and pedes-
trian-friendly environments than Atlantans, but the differ-
ences in preferences are insufficient to explain differences in
outcomes. Rather, Atlanta residents with high preferences for
pedestrian neighborhoods lived in neighborhoods that match
this description significantly more poorly than Bostonians.
These results suggest that if these groups in Atlanta had a set of
choices available that was less constrained into a low-density,
automobile-oriented development form, they might well opt
for such choices, and such a move would bring their prefer-
ences and their choices closer together. The reasonable hope
that this reform would ultimately reduce vehicle miles traveled
is best observed over the longer run.
These results should call into question presumptions
regarding the efficiency of a network of land use regulations
that seek to lower development densities. While economists
have frequently supported such policies because they can pro-
mote the development of relatively homogeneous communi-
ties that are efficient at service provision, other factors tend to
negate these efficiency gains. These include the loss to the
household associated with being excluded from its preferred
residential location, including the continuing costs of trans-
portation—or inaccessibility—that the exclusion engendered.
This argument is not intended to criticize land use regula-
tion per se. Such intervention arose from early reformist activ-
ism aimed at unhealthful urban conditions, a concern that
remains relevant today. Moreover, land use tools can very
appropriately be employed to coordinate the development of
the accessibility-based development forms in areas where there
is sufficient market impetus to bring these forms about. But
despite their reformist roots, the tools today are broadly mis-
used to exclude some development forms (and the population
groups that would inhabit them) from selected neighbor-
hoods and communities. They are not the only barriers, to be
sure. But as tools implemented by directed planning and
public policy, these regulations and their potential choice-
constraining effects deserve more critical scrutiny than is cur-
rently evident in the national debate about the relationship
between land use and transportation policy.
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Variable Definition Comments
Density Variables
Population
density
Total population divided by total residential land. Residential land extracted from land use geographic
information systems (GIS) coverage. This variable used
in natural log form for cluster analysis.
Employment
density
Jobs divided by total land area. Used in natural log form.
Road network
characteristics
Percentage “T”
intersections
The number of “T” intersections (versus four-way or
more intersections) divided by total intersections.
Indicator of connectedness of a street network.
Intersection
density
Intersections per square mile of total land area. Used in natural log form.
Street length
density
Total roadway length divided by total land area.
Average speed Average congested speeds of major streets in and sur-
rounding the traffic analysis zone (TAZ).
“Average speed” used created polygons bordered by links
of the transportation modeling network; these polygons
were overlain onto TAZs and values calculated by
weighted average of land area.
Average number
of lanes
Average number of lanes in major streets in and
surrounding the TAZ.
Calculated in a similar fashion to average speed.
Regional and local
accessibility
Automobile
accessibility
Accessibility to employment via automobile network.
For zone i, one of j total zones, accessi =
( )f c ij
j
n
j
=
∑ ×
1
employment .
This is the denominator of the production constrained
gravity model:
( )
( )
T P
A f c
A f c
ij i
j ij
z iz
z
n
= ×
×
×
=
∑
1
,
where Tij = trips between zones i and j, P = trip produc-
tions, A = trip attractions, f(cij) = friction factor associ-
ated with travel time c between zones i and j, and
z = all zones.
For consistency of interpretation, friction factors esti-
mated for Boston by the Central Transportation Plan-
ning Staff were used for both areas. The choice of
Boston factors has little impact on results, as Pearson
correlation (r) between the Boston and Atlanta friction
factors = .98. Friction factors: f(cij) = e–b(cij), where e =
the base of natural logarithms and b = a parameter
empirically and iteratively estimated to maximize the fit
between predictions of the gravity model (left) and
observed distribution of trip lengths, times, or costs.
Transit-auto
ratio
Ratio of employment accessibility by transit to employ-
ment accessibility by auto. Transit accessibility
calculated as automobile accessibility above.
Some TAZs offer no transit access; value become zero for
these zones.
Land use
intensity:
quarter mile
A measure of land use mixing: the number of surround-
ing quarter mile grid cells with a different land use
from the center cell, averaged over a TAZ.
Land use variety:
quarter mile
A measure of land use mixing: the number of land uses
in surrounding quarter mile grid cells different from
the land use of the center cell, averaged over a TAZ.
Land use
intensity:
two mile
As above, but a two-mile radius used.
Land use variety:
two mile
As above, but a two-mile radius used.
Appendix
Variables Used to Characterize Neighborhoods.
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Notes
1. Urban design aspects of case study neighborhoods in each of
the zones are analyzed in detail in Levine et al. (2002). Examples of
zone A neighborhoods in Boston included five-story lot line apart-
ment buildings and a public housing complex adjacent to down-
town of similar density. The parallel zone in Atlanta included some
centrally located, gated residential developments as well as apart-
ments incorporated in large downtown built-up blocks. Zone B in
Boston and Atlanta included neighborhoods of mixed single-
family homes and small apartments, generally with nearby retail.
Examples of zone C in Boston included a mix of apartment build-
ings along major routes, with single-family neighborhoods adja-
cent; zone C neighborhoods in Atlanta included 1940s-vintage
smaller bungalows with neighborhood commercial zones. Zone D
in Atlanta included single-family development of the 1950s to
1960s on midsized lots. Examples in Boston included older villages
incorporated into the Boston metropolitan area and their sur-
rounding development. Zone E in both Boston and Atlanta
included newly constructed single-family homes of more than
three thousand square feet and three-plus car garages. In Boston,
these were combined with some of the more remote older villages
of the region; in Atlanta, some large lot suburban development of
the 1960s and 1970s was included in this outer zone.
2. The marginal effect is
( / )/ ,δ δy x ni i
i
n
=
∑
1
where y = the probability of selection of a given neighborhood
type, x = transportation–land use preference score, n =number
of observations in sample, and i = an index for an individual
observation.
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